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TOWARDS A COHERENT AND CONSISTENT
FRAMEWORK FOR TREATMENT OF
CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION
CLIFFORD S. STANFORD*
“It’s not me who can’t keep a secret. It’s the people I tell that
can’t.” Abraham Lincoln1
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, new regulators, new rules, enhanced supervisory
and enforcement authority, and intensive public scrutiny of the
effectiveness of banking supervision have all amplified the longstanding
tensions and ambiguities that emerge from the exchange of information
critical to effective bank supervision, including “confidential supervisory
information” (“CSI”). The dynamics of supervisory dialogue involve
everything from routine examination matters to complex public
enforcement investigations. The D.C. Circuit described the context from
which CSI emerges as follows:
Bank safety and soundness supervision is an iterative
process of comment by the regulators and response by the
bank. The success of the supervision therefore depends
vitally upon the quality of communication between the
regulated banking firm and the bank regulatory agency.
This relationship is both extensive and informal. It is
extensive in that bank examiners concern themselves
with all manner of a bank’s affairs: Not only the
classification of assets and the review of financial

*Cliff

Stanford is a Partner with Alston & Bird, where he chairs the firm’s bank regulatory
practice. Mr. Stanford was formerly an official with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
Mr. Stanford thanks students Roy G. Dixon, III, John H. Hykes, Joanne Wu, and Richard W.
Gittings, and Professor Lissa L. Broome for their assistance in preparing this article.
1. GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/69197-it-s-not-me-who-can-t-k
eep-a-secret-it-s-the (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).
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transactions, but also the adequacy of security systems
and of internal reporting requirements, and even the
quality of managerial personnel are of concern to the
examiners. 2
As a policy matter, concerns about the treatment of CSI that
emerge from this supervisory dialogue must be reconciled with legal
privileges and the desirability of open government. These interrelated
concerns can complicate the dialogue between a supervised institution
and its supervisors. There are traps for the unwary for institutions that
are insufficiently mindful of how CSI is shared and maintained, ranging
from reputational damage and diminished competitive posture, to loss of
legal privilege and even to civil or criminal sanction. The agencies have
such elevated concerns about the improper use or disclosure of CSI that
enforcement actions, civil penalties, and even criminal referrals will be
used as a deterrent and punishment. Enforcement actions can serve as
definitional guardrails in understanding the scope of permitted use of
CSI, but many questions remain. 3
For example, in 1997, Asahi Bank, Ltd., then one of Japan’s
largest banks, consented to an order issued by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (“Board”) to pay a $5 million civil money
penalty, in part, for the misuse of CSI by its New York branch employees,
who allegedly accessed sealed boxes of documents stored by examiners
at Asahi Bank’s offices. No financial impropriety was alleged to have
resulted from the improper access. In addition to its civil enforcement
action, the Board referred the matter to the Justice Department. 4
In 2012, the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”)
banned a credit union director from serving on any NCUA-insured credit
union board, for having revealed the supervisory rating of a credit union

2. In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of Currency, and Sec’y of the Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
3. The principle “ex facto jus oritur” (the law arises from the facts) may be as useful as
any in derivation of a working understanding of CSI.
4. The bank employees’ access to the CSI was part of larger concerns about the bank’s
behavior. See The Asahi Bank, LTD., Nos. 96-023-B-FB, 96-023-B-FBR 1997 WL 61521,
at *1 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Feb. 13, 1997) (“Asahi and the New York
Branch are hereby assessed and shall pay, in settlement of these proceedings, a civil money
penalty in the amount of $5 million.”).

2018] COHERENT AND CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF CSI

43

led by a nominee for the NCUA’s governing board. 5 In this case, the
NCUA couched its enforcement action and prohibition order as
pertaining to a breach of fiduciary duty by the director.
Most recently, a former Federal Reserve Bank of New York
examiner and a Goldman Sachs banker each pled guilty to a misdemeanor
charge of theft of government property and consented to an order banning
each from banking. In this case, the banker wrongfully obtained
approximately thirty-five documents containing CSI from his former
subordinate at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The banker then
used those documents for purposes of furthering his career interests at
Goldman Sachs by sharing those documents within the company,
including documents relating to examinations of a bank that Goldman
Sachs was advising about a potential transaction. In this case, upon
learning of these issues, Goldman Sachs fired the banker as well as a
managing director with supervisory responsibility, and self-disclosed the
misuse of CSI to its regulators. Despite these actions, Goldman Sachs
paid a $50 million fine to the New York Department of Financial
Services, agreed to a three-year abstention from any consulting
arrangements that would require disclosure of CSI under New York law,
and further agreed to pay a $36 million fine to the Board. The Board’s
Order asserted that the firm had inadequate policies, training, controls,
and risk management oversight related to handling of CSI, and the Board
required implementation of an enhanced compliance program pertaining
to CSI.6 Further, the Board also brought a civil enforcement action
against the managing director also fired by Goldman Sachs, alleging
violations of law as well as breach of fiduciary duty. 7
5. See James M. Talbert, No. 12-0015-R2 (Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. Mar. 9, 2012)
(“[T]he NCUAB issues this order and prohibits Talbert from participating in any manner in
the conduct of the affairs of any federally-insured credit union and from continuing or
commencing to hold any office, or participate in any manner, in the conduct of the affairs of
any other institution or agency described in Section 206(g)(7) of the FCUA . . . .”); NCUA
Bars Former DC FCU Board Member, NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN. (Mar. 28, 2012), https:/
/www.ncua.gov/newsroom/Pages/NW20120328Talbert.aspx.
6. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Nos. 16-011-BH-C, 16-011-CMP-HC (Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Aug. 2, 2016) (“[T]he Firm lacked adequate policies and
procedures designed to detect or prevent the unauthorized dissemination and use of
confidential supervisory information belonging to the Board of Governors and other banking
regulators, which resulted in legal and reputational risks to the Firm. . . .”).
7. See Joseph Jiampietro, Nos. 16-012-E-1, 16-012-CMP-1 (Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys. Aug. 2, 2016) (showing the factual allegations of the Board’s notice
articulate a detailed review of the Board’s findings that Mr. Jiampietro was aware of the
restrictions on use of CSI, but allegedly fostered a culture over a course of several years that
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Considering the examples above, there are clearly lessons to be
learned. First, the agencies take improper disclosures of CSI seriously,
and will bring civil actions and make criminal referrals in appropriate
instances. Disclosure or use of CSI, except as expressly permitted by the
appropriate agency, may be subject to criminal penalties. 8 Further, as
seen in the Goldman Sachs Order 9 and other enforcement actions, the
agencies expect banks to have appropriate compliance programs in place
to ensure that CSI is not misused. However, despite the seriousness of
these issues, the rules governing CSI are disparate and in some cases
inconsistent, forcing some institutions to consider how to reconcile
conflicting regulatory expectations.
Larger, more complex banking institutions may have supervisory
relationships or enforcement-related dialogue with the Board, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”), the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), state regulators
and tax authorities, state attorneys general, foreign regulators, and others.
In addition, banks have a choice of charter and of federal prudential
supervisor, and the degree of clarity and permissiveness of the agency’s
rules pertaining to CSI may be a factor in regulatory arbitrage.
Further reflecting the importance of this issue, definitions and
permissible uses of CSI have significance in other contexts beyond the
scope of this article. For the distinct but related purposes of the federal
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), matters that are “contained in or
related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on
behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or
supervision of financial institutions” are exempt from disclosure to the
public by the federal government. 10 The same policy underpins the
led to the misuse of CSI within the company, including use of CSI in “pitch” materials to
potential clients).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2016).
9. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., No. 16-011-BH-C, 16-011-CMP-HC (Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 2016) (“[T]he Firm shall submit to the Board of
Governors an acceptable written plan, and timeline for implementation, to enhance the
effectiveness of the internal controls and compliance functions regarding the identification,
monitoring, and control of confidential supervisory information.”).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (2016) (discussing “Exemption 8”). Each of the agencies has
promulgated rules implementing the FOIA. Most states have similar “sunshine” or open
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common law “bank examiner privilege,” which may be asserted by the
agencies to shield disclosure of CSI as an evidentiary matter in the
context of litigation.11 Separately, CSI may contain communications
subject to legal privilege, such that institutions must understand whether
statutory protections pertaining to “selective waiver” preserve the
privileged nature of those communications. 12
Against this backdrop, this article examines the definitions of CSI
and the treatment of confidential communications between banks13 and
their supervisors—the Board, the OCC, the FDIC, as well as with the
CFPB—in the exercise of each agency’s supervisory and enforcement
powers. It proceeds in five parts. Part II discusses the agency definitions
of CSI, both in an abstract sense and as the rules limit permitted use and
disclosure.14 Part III provides illustrative examples of the implications of
the agencies’ disparate rules.15 Part IV posits whether market signals
have eroded the veil of secrecy afforded to certain key elements of CSI.16

government laws governing state agencies, including state bank supervisors. An exposition
of these state laws is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., The Open Government Guide,
THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/ogg/index.php
(listing a complete compendium of information on each state’s open records and open
meetings laws).
11. See, e.g., In re Subpoena Served Upon the Comptroller of Currency, and Sec’y of the
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 967 F.2d 630, at 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Bank
management must be open and forthcoming in response to the inquiries of bank examiners,
and the examiners must in turn be frank in expressing their concerns about the bank. These
conditions simply could not be met as well if communications between the bank and its
regulators were not privileged.”).
12. Federal law provides for “selective waiver,” such that no waiver results from
compelled or voluntary disclosure to any federal banking agency, the CFPB, a state bank
supervisor, or a foreign banking authority in the context of any supervisory or regulatory
process. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(x) (2016) (discussing privileges not affected by disclosure to
banking agency or supervisor). Certain of these agencies may, in turn, share privileged
information with certain other agencies without waiving privilege. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(t)
(2016). However, these statutes are not drafted of whole cloth. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green,
The Attorney-Client Privilege – Selective Compulsion, Selective Waiver, and Selective
Disclosure: Is Bank Regulation Exceptional?, 2013 J. PROF. LAW. 85, 88 (2013) (“This state
of affairs raises questions about the wisdom of the federal laws and regulatory policies. . . .”).
13. For purposes of simplicity, this article uses the term “bank” to mean any depository
institution chartered by a state or by the OCC, any foreign banking organization operating in
the United States, and the U.S. subsidiaries or affiliates of any of the foregoing. While this
article focuses on banks, the same principles apply generally to credit unions in their
relationships with the NCUA or to state credit union regulators. Further, certain non-bank
firms are also subject to similar supervision by the CFPB, or as a result of the oversight of
third party service providers by the agencies.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
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Finally, Part V presents considerations for potential reform. 17 While
many states have their own rules pertaining to CSI, further complicating
the landscape, a complete analysis of those rules is beyond the scope of
this article.
Throughout, the article identifies some suggested
opportunities for reform, and discusses some common practical concerns
that arise from supervisory discourse. 18
II. CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION
A.

Definitions in the Abstract

CSI can generally be defined as information prepared for, by or
on behalf of, or for the use of a bank’s supervisors. At its core, this
includes supervisory ratings, examination reports and supervisory letters,
and the iterative back-and-forth that emerges as banks are subject to
regulatory supervision. Beyond these axiomatic points, however, the
Board, OCC, FDIC, and CFPB each have distinct definitions and
requirements. In many cases, what constitutes CSI must be assessed
under a “know it when you see it” standard, but the agencies have
provided definitions in the abstract, varying between agencies:
Board

(1) Confidential supervisory information means:
(i) Exempt information19 consisting of reports of
examination, inspection and visitation, confidential
operating and condition reports, and any information derived
from, related to, or contained in such reports;
(ii) Information gathered by the Board in the course of any

17. See infra Part V.
18. The agencies also impose information security safeguards, premised on the protection

of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information. In addition, privacy law,
including the protection of certain consumer information, presents an entirely separate but
related discipline that also brings forth a range of complex concerns that can bleed into how
an institution approaches protection of sensitive information such as CSI.
19. Reflective of the Board’s role in coordinated supervision of state-chartered, Federal
Reserve member banks, “exempt information” is defined by the Board to include any
information exempt under Exemption 8, but expanded to include information contained in or
related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the
use of “a state financial institution supervisory agency.” 12 C.F.R. § 261.14(a)(8) (2017).
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investigation, suspicious activity report,20 cease-and-desist
orders, civil money penalty enforcement orders, suspension,
removal or prohibition orders, or other orders or actions
under [enumerated laws pursuant to which the Board has
supervisory or enforcement authority]; except—
(A) Such final orders, amendments, or modifications of final
orders, or other actions or documents that are specifically
required to be published or made available to the public
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1818(u),21 or other applicable law,
including the record of litigated proceedings; and
(B) The public section of Community Reinvestment Act
examination reports . . . ;
and
(iii) Any documents prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use
of the Board, a Federal Reserve Bank, a federal or state
financial institutions supervisory agency, or a bank or bank
holding company or other supervised financial institution.
(2) Confidential supervisory information does not include
documents prepared by a supervised financial institution for

20. Suspicious activity reports, or “SARs,” pertain to reports of suspicious potential
criminal activity by banks and others, and are subject to an independent scheme of law to
restrict their disclosure, derived from the Bank Secrecy Act. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2016), et seq.;
12 C.F.R. §§ 208.62, 211.5(k), 211.24(f), 225.4(f) (2017) (pertaining to reports prescribed by
the Board); 12 C.F.R. Part 353 (2017) (requiring notifying the FDIC); 12 C.F.R. Part 748
(2017) (pertaining to credit unions notifying the NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2017) (requiring
all national banks licensed or chartered by the OCC to comply); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320 (2017)
(requiring SARs to be filed with FinCEN). Disclosure of SARs other than to law enforcement,
to the supervisory agencies, or as otherwise expressly permitted, is subject to criminal
sanction. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2016) (setting forth criminal penalties). Courts also
recognize a “SAR privilege” on similar grounds as bank examination privilege.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u) (2016) provides for public disclosure of formal enforcement
actions such as written agreements, unless determined to be contrary to the public interest, of
all final orders resulting from any administrative enforcement proceeding, and any
modification or termination of the foregoing. Section 1818(u) further provides for the
publication of hearing transcripts, subject to the agency’s filing of documents under seal as
disclosure is determined by the agency to be “contrary to the public interest.” Notably, the
statute does not authorize the withholding, or to prohibit the disclosure, of any information to
Congress.
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its own business purposes and that are in its possession.22
(b) Non-public OCC information:
(1) Means information that the OCC is not required to release
under the FOIA . . . or that the OCC has not yet published or
made available pursuant to [Section 1818(u)] and includes:
(i) A record created or obtained:
(A) By the OCC in connection with the OCC’s performance
of its responsibilities, such as a record concerning
supervision, licensing, regulation, and examination of a
national bank, a Federal savings association, a bank holding
company, a savings and loan holding company, or an
affiliate; or
(B) By the OTS23 in connection with the OTS’s performance
of its responsibilities, such as a record concerning
supervision, licensing, regulation, and examination of a
Federal savings association, a savings and loan holding
company, or an affiliate;
(ii) A record compiled by the OCC or the OTS in connection
with either agency’s enforcement responsibilities;
(iii) A report of examination, supervisory correspondence, an
investigatory file compiled by the OCC or OTS in connection
with an investigation, and any internal agency memorandum,
whether the information is in the possession of the OCC or
some other individual or entity;
(iv) Confidential OCC information obtained by a third party
or otherwise incorporated in the records of a third party,
including another government agency;

22. 12 C.F.R. § 261.2(c) (2017) (emphasis added).
23. The former Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) was absorbed by the OCC as a

result of Dodd-Frank. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) § 312, 12 U.S.C. § 5412 (2016).
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(v) Testimony from, or an interview with, a current or former
OCC employee, officer, or agent or a former OTS employee,
officer, or agent concerning information acquired by that
person in the course of his or her performance of official
duties with the OCC or OTS or due to that person’s official
status at the OCC or OTS; and
(vi) Confidential information relating to operating and no
longer operating national banks, Federal savings
associations, and savings and loan holding companies as well
as their subsidiaries and their affiliates.
(2) Is the property of the Comptroller. 24
FDIC

[Confidential supervisory information includes:]
Records that are contained in or related to examination,
operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or
for the use of the FDIC or any agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions. 25

CFPB

(1) Confidential supervisory information means:
(i) Reports of examination, inspection and visitation, nonpublic operating, condition, and compliance reports, and any
information contained in, derived from, or related to such
reports;
(ii) Any documents, including reports of examination,
prepared by, or on behalf of, or for the use of the CFPB or
any other Federal, State, or foreign government agency in the
exercise of supervisory authority over a financial institution,

24. 12 C.F.R. § 4.32(b) (2017).
25. 12 C.F.R. § 309.5(g)(8) (2017). This is the FDIC’s implementation of Exemption 8.

The agency provides no other definition by regulation, but does expound upon the treatment
of supervisory ratings as CSI in an advisory letter published by the Board, OCC, FDIC, and
OTS. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 13-2005, INTERAGENCY ADVISORY
ON THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE S UPERVISORY RATING AND OTHER NONPUBLIC S UPERVISORY
INFORMATION (2005) [hereinafter 2005 INTERAGENCY ADVISORY] (reminding all banking
organizations of the prohibition to disclose their CAMELS rating).
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and any information derived from such documents;
(iii) Any communications between the CFPB and a
supervised financial institution or a Federal, State, or foreign
government agency related to the CFPB’s supervision of the
institution;
(iv) any information provided to the CFPB by a financial
institution to enable the CFPB to monitor for risks to
consumers in the offering or provision of consumer financial
products or services, or to assess whether an institution
should be considered a covered person, as that term is
defined by 12 U.S.C. 5481, or is subject to the CFPB’s
supervisory authority; and/or
(v) Information that is exempt from disclosure pursuant to
[Exemption 8].
(2) Confidential supervisory information does not include
documents prepared by a financial institution for its own
business purposes and that the CFPB does not possess.26
As can be seen by the preceding definitions, there is a
fundamental dissimilarity in the definition of what constitutes CSI among
the agencies. There are a range of questions that emerge. What
constitutes information “derived from” or “related to” an examination
report? Is any information developed by a bank in response to an
examination finding considered CSI? Is it the case that information may
be CSI, but not also covered by Exemption 8 for FOIA purposes? Or, are
these equivalent such that case law developing the coverage of
Exemption 8 can inform what is to be treated as CSI? Should a banking
group with many regulators adopt the most conservative definition?
Which one is that? Should the bank synthesize the definitions to derive
its own? What are the risks of that?
Should a bank whose primary federal supervisor is the FDIC look
to the other agencies’ definitions for greater certainty? Does the FDIC’s
definition relate to any supervisory dialogue outside of examination
26. 12 C.F.R. § 1070.2(i) (2017) (emphasis added).
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reports? Does it clearly include state examination materials, as the
Board’s rule does? What about information provided to the FDIC in the
context of an applications process, such as for a merger or a new activity,
which are not clearly examination, operating, or condition reports?
With regard to interagency communications, the CFPB makes it
clear that interagency communications pertaining to the CFPB’s
supervision of an institution constitute CSI. The Board includes any
documents prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of the Board, a Federal
Reserve Bank, a federal or state financial institutions supervisory agency,
but does not—as the CFPB does—include any foreign government
agency. 27 The OCC only includes any confidential OCC information
obtained by another agency. The FDIC is silent on this issue.
When the Board and the CFPB exclude documents prepared by
the bank for its own business purposes, the Board references documents
that are in the bank’s possession, but the CFPB references documents that
are not in the CFPB’s possession. If, for example, a large organization
obtains a third party review of its compliance management system for
business purposes, and the report is also provided to the Board and the
CFPB upon supervisory request, is that information only CSI for so long
as it is “possessed” by the agency? What does this mean in the context
of shared databases of documents and information? Which agency’s
information is it?
In many ways, these and other questions and apparent
inconsistencies in definitions may seem academic, but they take on real
world meaning in the context of civil or criminal supervisory sanction for
misuse of CSI.
B.

Definitions Based Upon Usage and Context

While the agencies have each defined CSI differently in their
rules, ambiguities about CSI also emerge in the context of determining
27. Note that other law specifically covers the interagency sharing of information with
the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission, for purposes of antitrust analysis
in the context of a merger review. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828b (2016) (“To the extent not prohibited
by other law, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System shall make available to the Attorney General and the Federal Trade
Commission any data in the possession of any such banking agency that the antitrust agency
deems necessary for antitrust review of any transaction requiring notice to any such antitrust
agency or the approval of such agency. . . .”).
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how it is used, by whom, and for what purpose. Again, these ambiguities
are brought into sharp focus by the threat of civil penalties and potentially
criminal sanctions for unlawful use or disclosure. An understanding of
the agency CSI rules, and how they are applied, is therefore a significant
practical concern for each bank.
Likely reflective of the emerging ubiquity of electronic data, as
well as instances of misuse of CSI, the federal prudential banking
supervisors began to issue guidance in the late 1990s to better refine what
constitutes CSI and how the agencies expect that information to be
treated. 28 Agency guidance was later codified by the agencies in their
regulations, but the agencies diverged in the degree to which they granted
banks authority to divulge CSI.
In addition, the agencies issued the 2005 Interagency Advisory, 29
which predated the CFPB. This advisory was prompted specifically by
agency concerns about insurers requesting or requiring banks to provide
their CAMELS ratings in the context of underwriting directors and
officers liability (“D&O”) policies. The 2005 Interagency Advisory
generally referenced existing agency rules regarding disclosure of CSI,
emphasized the importance of those rules, and pointed to a range of
public sources of information about banks, such as Call Reports and
Thrift Financial Reports, Uniform Bank Performance Reports, SEC
filings, rating agency reports, and public enforcement actions as
alternatives to disclosure of CAMELS ratings or other CSI.30
Collectively, these efforts have established a number of
fundamental principles in understanding CSI. First, CSI is the property
of the agency, not the supervised institution, and the agency has the power
to permit or deny its use or disclosure for any purpose. 31 Second,
28. See e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., CIRCULAR NO. 11002, IMPROPER DISCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1997)
(interestingly, this circular was not issued by the Board, but rather by its delegee, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., SARC-99-07, APPEALS OF MATERIAL
SUPERVISORY DETERMINATIONS : GUIDELINES & DECISIONS (1999) (finding that a bank had
violated FDIC rules when the bank provided members of Congress and the General
Accounting Office with copies of its appeal of an examination rating).
29. See 2005 INTERAGENCY ADVISORY, supra note 25.
30. Subsequent developments have expanded this list. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act
required public disclosures of certain larger banks’ “living wills,” as well as annual
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) and other stress test results.
31. This principle has been codified by the agencies. 12 C.F.R. §§ 4.32(b)(2), 4.36 (2017)
(OCC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 309.5(g)(8), 309.6(a), 350.9 (2017) (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 261.2(c)(1),
261.20(g), 261.22(e) (Board); 12 C.F.R. § 792.30 (NCUA).
OF
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supervisory ratings, such as the CAMELS, RFI/C, or ROCA ratings, are
sacrosanct, and exam reports are of equal rank. 32 Third, the agencies will
respond collectively to issues of common import, such as the demands of
insurers for CSI, in order to provide “cover” to banks under pressure to
provide CSI to third parties.
However, rules pertaining to permitted disclosures of CSI vary in
material ways among the agencies, and more recent rules from the CFPB
have altered the landscape. Again, recent civil and criminal enforcement
actions have brought into focus how and whether any institution can
assure compliance with the agencies’ divergent standards. Given the
blurring of lines among the supervisory authority of the agencies, in
particular for larger institutions, these distinctions may require them to
accept the lowest common denominator, which may constrain the
flexibility of the permitted business use of CSI in unnecessary and
potentially costly ways.
1. The Board’s Rules
Below are key points of the Board’s rules that guide a Boardsupervised institution in determining whether and when disclosure of CSI
is permitted. The Board explicitly permits a bank to provide CSI “to its
directors, officers, and employees, and to its parent bank holding
company or parent savings and loan holding company and its directors,
officers, and employees.”33 The Board also permits a bank to provide CSI
to any certified public accountant or legal counsel employed by the
supervised financial institution, subject to certain conditions, including
32. Note that not every supervisor has held fast to this principle. In 2012, the North
Carolina Credit Union Division permitted a state credit union to disclose its supervisory
rating. In response, the NCUA suspended joint examinations with the state agency for a
period of time, forcing North Carolina credit unions to submit to separate examinations.
CREDIT UNION NAT’L ASS’N, NEW: NCUA TO STOP SEPARATE EXAMS IN N.C. (2013), http://
news.cuna.org/articles/print/NEW:_NCUA_to_stop_separate_exams_in_NC.
33. 12 C.F.R. § 261.20(b) (2017) (emphasis added). The Board also provides specific
rules governing disclosures of CSI by the Board to supervised institutions and to federal and
state supervisory agencies, and to law enforcement, among other specific instances. See 12
C.F.R. §§ 261.20(a), (c) (2017) (discussing disclosure of confidential supervisory information
to supervised financial institutions and disclosure upon request to Federal financial institution
supervisory agencies); 12 C.F.R. § 261 (2017). The Board states that CSI is considered
privileged information that it will not normally provide to the public, and provides rules
governing when it would produce CSI in a litigation context or subject to a subpoena or other
process. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 261.22, 261.23 (2017) (setting requirements in other circumstances
of disclosure).
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that these advisors may review CSI only on the premises of the supervised
financial institution, and shall not make or retain any copies of such
information, and may not make any further disclosure of the CSI except
upon prior written approval of the Board’s General Counsel, except as
necessary to provide advice to the bank. 34 The Board’s rules state further
that “[n]o person obtaining access to confidential supervisory
information pursuant to this section may make a personal copy of any
such information; and no person may remove confidential supervisory
information from the premises of the institution or agency in possession
of such information except as permitted by specific language in this
regulation or by the Board.”35
As recently as 2013, largely reiterating the 2005 Interagency
Advisory, the Board summarized and reinforced its warnings to
community banks to ensure appropriate treatment of CSI, as follows:
OK to Disclose:
•

Directors, officers, employees

•

Parent company directors, officers, employees

•

Certified public accountant (subject to limitations)

•

Legal counsel (subject to limitations)

Check with Appropriate Agency:
•

Insurers

•

Creditors

•

Shareholders

•

Customers
34. Id.
35. 12 C.F.R. § 261.20(g) (2017). While not explicit, a fair reading of this rule is that it

does not constrain the specific disclosures of CSI to legal counsel and CPAs, such that
approval of the Board’s General Counsel is not, for example, required for an outside lawyer
to review a bank’s exam reports on its premises.
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•

Rating agencies

•

General public

•

Potential acquirers 36
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The Board has required, since at least 1988, that certified public
accountants and legal counsel may only access CSI “on the premises” of
the supervised institution.37 This means that, without specific permission,
a Board-supervised institution may not reveal “matters requiring
attention” or citations of legal violations for which the institution may
require legal advice, unless the lawyer is on site at an office of the
institution. While conceivably an outside lawyer may review electronic
documents containing CSI, according to this rule, the lawyer may only
do so at a computer that is “on the premises” of the supervised institution.
The Board’s pre-email and pre-Internet rule, while clearly intended to
maintain custody and control of paper documents, does not reflect the
modern reality of secure email, protected data rooms, and other
mechanisms for sharing CSI with legal counsel or a CPA. 38 Because the
Board’s rule also restricts making or retaining “copies” of CSI—defined
to include any information derived from exam reports—the Board could
also sanction a bank, and its legal counsel or CPA, if memoranda or
analyses of legal or accounting concerns include references to CSI, as
broadly defined. Further, “copies” of that information would be made as
a matter of course as files are shared (within the sanctioned relationship
with counsel or the CPA). On their face, the Board’s rules also would
seem to prohibit a law firm from retaining records of privileged attorneyclient discourse that contains CSI.

36. See CMTY. B ANKING CONNECTIONS, CONFIDENTIAL SUPERVISORY INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE RULES (2013), https://communitybankingconnections.org/articles/2013/Q1/Co
nfidential-Supervisory-Information-Disclosure-Rules. Certain points of this guidance are
further discussed below (“The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board)
has published rules regarding the disclosure of confidential supervisory information by
financial institutions supervised by the Federal Reserve.”).
37. See 53 Fed. Reg. 20815 (June 7, 1988).
38. The Board had opportunities in subsequent rounds of updates to this rule to address
this anachronism, but has not done so. See 62 Fed. Reg. 54359 (Oct. 20, 1997); 76 Fed. Reg.
56601 (Sept. 13, 2011); 79 Fed. Reg. 6077 (Feb. 3, 2014).
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Moreover, this limitation is incongruent with the statutory
requirement that an insured state member bank “shall transmit” a copy of
its most recent examination report and any non-public enforcement action
to its external auditor.39 Further, the Board, along with the other
prudential agencies, have long indicated, that banks “should provide
[external auditors] with access to all examination reports and written
communication between the institution and the agencies or state bank
supervisor since the last external auditing activity.” 40
Similarly, the Board’s rules do not permit disclosure of CSI to
other advisors that are not legal counsel or public accountants. In recent
years, a variety of consulting firms have evolved into key resources for
banks addressing complex regulatory concerns and compliance matters.
In some instances, these consulting firms are hired by legal counsel,
establishing legal privilege protections for the work of the consultants.
However, the Board’s rule does not permit direct disclosure of CSI by a
bank to its consultants, and prohibits disclosure of CSI by lawyers or
CPAs to those consultants “without the prior written approval of the
Board’s General Counsel except as necessary to provide advice to the
supervised financial institution, its parent bank holding company, or the
officers, directors, and employees of such supervised financial institution
and parent bank holding company.”
The Board’s rule permits disclosure of CSI by a bank to its parent
holding company, but not to other affiliates. For example, information
necessary to enable a holding company to develop an enterprise-wide
view of the company’s risks can include CSI. However, it is unclear
whether the results of that risk analysis, increasingly expected of nearly
every bank holding company by the Board as a supervisory matter, can
be provided to the non-bank sister affiliates of the bank, unless the
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(h) (2016). This statute was added by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”) in 1991. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236.
40. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., INTERAGENCY POLICY
STATEMENT ON EXTERNAL AUDITING PROGRAMS OF BANKS AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS
(1999) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The policy statement encourages disclosure
of any supervisory MOU, written agreements, administrative orders, reports of action initiated
by a federal or state banking agency, and any proposed or ordered assessments of civil money
penalties against the institution or an institution-related party, as well as any associated
correspondence. The auditor must maintain the confidentiality of examination reports and
other confidential supervisory information. Also, the engagement letter should grant
examiners access to all the accountant’s or auditor’s workpapers and other material pertaining
to the institution prepared in the course of performing the external audit.
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analysis is not derived from or related to CSI. Further, the Board’s rules
also would not permit CSI to be disclosed to insurers for important
insurance coverage such as D&O policies, including to provide a notice
of circumstances in order to preserve rights of claims against the policy.
2. The OCC’s Rules
Below are key points of the OCC’s rules that guide an OCCsupervised institution in determining whether and when a disclosure of
CSI is permitted. First, while impliedly permitted by the rule, there is no
express provision permitting an OCC-supervised bank to disclose CSI to
its holding company, in contrast with the Board’s rules and the rules of
the FDIC, described below. On the other hand, the OCC expressly
permits disclosures “when necessary or appropriate for business
purposes” to “a person or organization officially connected with the bank
or Federal savings association as officer, director, employee, attorney,
auditor, or independent auditor.”41 Further, the OCC permits disclosure
of CSI to consultants, subject to a non-disclosure agreement meeting
prescribed terms. There are no restrictions in the OCC’s rules on making
such disclosures only on the premises of the bank, or subject to
limitations on retention of copies, as in the Board’s rules.
3. The FDIC’s Rules
The FDIC provides detailed rules for limited disclosure of its CSI
pertaining to disclosure by the FDIC itself in its various capacities, but
these rules provide only limited flexibility with regard to a bank’s ability
to share CSI with third parties without permission of the FDIC.42 In
general, the FDIC will provide directors, officers, employees, or agents
of the regulated entity access to CSI in the performance of their official
duties. However, the authorization provided by the FDIC’s regulation
does not extend, for example, to an officer of the bank providing CSI to
any agent, such as a lawyer hired by the bank or its external auditor, if
not authorized by the FDIC itself. Despite the FDIC’s restriction, as
noted above with regard to the Board’s rules, federal statutes require that
insured banks “shall transmit” copies of examination reports and other
41. 12 C.F.R. § 4.37(b)(2) (2017).
42. 12 C.F.R. § 309.6 (2017).
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CSI to their external auditors, and this was reinforced by interagency
policy.43
Unlike the other agencies, the FDIC has a highly prescriptive rule
that permits disclosure of FDIC exam reports to the bank’s parent holding
company and its directors, officers, and employees. Requirements
include that the parent must own 50% of the bank’s voting stock, the bank
board of directors must annually resolve, in a prescribed manner, to
authorize the reproduction and furnishing of reports, and the minutes
must record certain information pertaining to the disclosure. 44 As noted
above, the Board’s rules authorize disclosure, and the OCC only
impliedly authorizes disclosure. Neither of these agencies have the same
prescribed standards as the FDIC.
Notably, unlike other agencies, the FDIC does not provide for the
disclosure of CSI by a bank to its lawyers, consultants, or service
providers, without permission of the agency. The FDIC has been
particularly sensitive in the context of its receivership role for troubled or
failing banks. In 2012, the FDIC issued guidance stating that it is a breach
of fiduciary duty, and a violation of FDIC regulations, for directors and
officers, and their lawyers, to copy and remove CSI and other financial
institution records in anticipation of litigation or an enforcement action
against that director or officer in his or her personal capacity. 45
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1831m(h) (2016). This statute was added by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (“FDICIA”) in 1991. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236.
44. 12 C.F.R. § 309.6(b)(7)(iii) (2017). The FDIC’s rules for disclosure of CSI to parent
holding companies do not provide for disclosure to any non-bank sister affiliates of the bank.
See id. (permitting subsidiary depository institutions to furnish examination reports to the
parent holding company without prior approval).
45. See Letter from the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. on Guidelines Regarding the Copying
and Removal of Confidential Financial Institution Information (Mar. 19, 2012) (reminding
that removal of supervisory records in anticipation of litigation or enforcement is a breach of
fiduciary duty). This guidance was issued following the FDIC’s lawsuits, as receiver, against
law firms and a bank’s holding company for having removed records of a failing bank. Id.;
see, e.g., FDIC v. Bryan Cave, LLP, No. 10-CV-03666 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (discussing that the
FDIC alleged that bank officers and directors provided the law firm with copies of the bank’s
books and records to aid in their defense, in violation of federal laws, internal bank policies,
and in some cases written agreements by copying the documents and providing those copies
to counsel. The FDIC ultimately dismissed its case after a private settlement). The FDIC has
asserted that “[p]ursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A), the FDIC as receiver obtains the
exclusive rights and benefits associated with the failed institution’s documents and records.”
Letter from Michael Krimminger, Acting Gen. Counsel, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., to David
Baris, Exec. Dir., American Assoc. of Bank Dirs. (Jan. 25, 2011), http://aabd.org/fdicresponds-to-aabd-request-toallow-bank-directors-access-to-bank-records-for-defenseagainstlawsuits/.
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4. The CFPB’s Rules
As the newest agency on the block, the CFPB’s current rules
provide both the most clearly defined and the most permissive rules of
those surveyed with regard to the permitted use and disclosure of CSI that
belongs to the CFPB.46 The CFPB provides the most definitional
certainty and operational flexibility of any of the agencies with regard to
use and disclosure of CSI. Affiliates, lawyers, contractors, consultants,
and “service providers” are all permitted to obtain CSI as necessary to
provide advice or services to the institution. Further, unlike any of the
other agencies, the CFPB’s rules explicitly permit disclosure to directors,
officers, and employees of all affiliates “to the extent that the disclosure
of such CSI is relevant to the performance of such individuals’ assigned
duties.”47 In turn, these affiliates may also disclose CSI to CPAs,
lawyers, contractors, consultants, or service providers.
Instead of requiring prior permission in these instances, the CFPB
permits disclosure unless otherwise directed by the agency, and imposes
requirements on the recipients of the CSI. The recipient may not “utilize,
make, or retain copies of, or disclose CSI for any purpose, except as is
necessary to provide advice or services to the supervised financial
institution or its affiliate.” 48 This approach allows, for example, a bank
to include restrictions on the use of CSI in the form of non-disclosure
terms in services contracts, rather than having to seek prior approval of
senior staff of the agency. These provisions perhaps reflect that modern
banks need the services of third parties, often on an expedited basis, and
that these institutions are part of larger organizations with consolidated
operations and risk management needs.
While the CFPB’s rules are notable for their clarity and utility,
the CFPB has also proposed a controversial loosening of its rules with
regard to sharing of CSI by the CFPB with non-supervisory agencies,
such as state attorneys general.49 This proposal received significant
industry response, including concerns about the chilling effect that such
disclosure would have on the confidential supervisory relationship and
46. See 12 C.F.R. § 1070.42(b) (2017) (discussing disclosure of confidential supervisory
information by a supervised financial institution or its affiliates).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Amendments Relating to Disclosure of Records and Information, 81 Fed. Reg. 58310
(Aug. 24, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pts. 1070 and 1091).
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the potential waiver of legal privilege. 50 As of the close of 2017, the
CFPB has not finalized its proposed rule.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGENCIES’ CSI
REGIME
In considering the landscape above, there are a range of practical
issues that arise with regard to the definition and use of CSI. A list of
those issues includes, but is not limited to, the following:
•

When can a bank reveal CSI of one agency to another agency? For
example, if an on-site examiner demands to see the responses of the
bank to supervisory “matters requiring attention” issued by another
agency.

•

In a joint exam by state and federal prudential supervisors, which
agency’s rules govern the treatment of CSI?

•

In an examination of a third-party service provider by the FFIEC
under its authority pursuant to the Bank Service Company Act,
which agency’s definitions and rules govern?

•

How should a bank track, label, and maintain CSI? Is this a risk
governance issue, a legal issue, an information security issue?
Should the bank maintain labels, or header/footer legends, to identify
CSI? What should those legends say? How should CSI information
be maintained when it may also be subject to legal privilege, to
private non-disclosure agreements, or to FOIA exemptions? Should
institutions establish compliance programs that ensure they meet the
standards emerging from the Goldman Sachs Order? 51

50. See, e.g., Letter from The Clearing House, et al., to Monica Jackson, Office of the
Exec. Sec’y, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/
document?D=CFPB-2016-0039-0013 (“We appreciate the Bureau’s recognition of the
importance of providing maximum protection to sensitive information and its efforts to
provide additional clarity and transparency regarding its information protection and disclosure
practices. However, we believe that certain of the Bureau’s proposed amendments would
inappropriately and unnecessarily expand the universe of entities that could receive protected
information.”).
51. See The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Nos. 16-011-BH-C, 16-011-CMP-HC (Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Aug. 2, 2016) (“[T]he Firm lacked adequate policies and
procedures designed to detect or prevent the unauthorized dissemination and use of
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•

What should a bank do when it receives unsolicited CSI from a third
party? For example, what if an applicant for a job at the bank
references work history that included remediation of non-public
supervisory concerns at another bank?

•

If the bank has entered into a non-disclosure agreement with a third
party, the agencies have asserted that such agreements should not
impede supervisory access to such information. 52 Further, the Board
has asserted that “identification of information requested by, or
provided to, supervisory staff—including the fact that an
examination has taken or will take place—is related to an
examination and falls within the definition of confidential
supervisory information.”53 In this case, the bank must ensure that
non-disclosure agreements expressly permit access by their
supervisors to confidential information shared by third parties. This
access can create friction in negotiations.

•

For publicly traded institutions, tensions may be created between
restrictions on disclosure of CSI and securities law disclosure
requirements. Many publicly traded banks feel obliged by the
securities laws to pre-emptively disclose the impact of their
regulatory status in securities filings. While the bank cannot reveal
its CAMELS composite, RFI/C, compliance or other ratings, it may
feel compelled by the securities laws to describe the effect of any
memorandum of understanding or other non-public enforcement
order on matters important to shareholders, such as limitations on
dividends or debt. Surprisingly, the agencies have not issued any

confidential supervisory information belonging to the Board of Governors and other banking
regulators, which resulted in legal and reputational risks to the Firm. . . .”).
52. See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Supervision and Regulation
Letter on Confidentiality Provisions in Third-Party Agreements (Dec. 13, 2007) (“It is
contrary to Federal Reserve regulation and policy for agreements to contain confidentiality
provisions that (1) restrict the banking organization from providing information to Federal
Reserve supervisory staff; (2) require or permit, without the prior approval of the Federal
Reserve, the banking organization to disclose to a counterparty that any information will be
or was provided to Federal Reserve supervisory staff; or (3) require or permit, without the
prior approval of the Federal Reserve, the banking organization to inform a counterparty of a
current or upcoming Federal Reserve examination or any nonpublic Federal Reserve
supervisory initiative or action.”).
53. Id.
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clarifying guidance on this issue, despite its impact on a wide range
of firms.
•

In the context of any bank merger or acquisition, appropriate
diligence naturally includes a review of the regulatory status of the
partner, its compliance and risk management systems, and other
areas not immediately apparent from a review of the financial
statements. 54 The acquirer or resulting bank wants to be sure it is not
assuming a set of problems that can undermine the value of the deal.
The target wants some assurance that the acquirer can complete the
transaction as it requires regulatory approval. While there is
substantial information publicly available, and even though deal
diligence is always pursued pursuant to non-disclosure agreements,
where CSI is so broadly defined to include information “derived
from or related to” examination materials there is a delicate dance
required to ensure that appropriate diligence can be accomplished. 55
IV. DO MARKET S IGNALS AND PERMITTED DISCLOSURES UNDERMINE
THE PROTECTIVE REGIME FOR CSI?

While the agencies have expressed substantial interest in
maintaining the secrecy of a bank’s ratings, justifying an entire regime of
protection for CSI, increasingly the regulatory status of an institution can
be deduced from its behavior and by public regulatory sanctions. Some
may argue that the composite CAMELS or compliance ratings of a bank
are an open secret. Banks with a “4” or “5” composite CAMELS rating
typically face a public enforcement action. The market also can often
deduce when banks have a composite CAMELS rating of “3” or a
subjective management rating of “3,” as these institutions will typically
have to stay on the sidelines for any “expansionary” activity, including
not only mergers and acquisitions, but also any branching activity. The
54. This same diligence is appropriate for underwriters of a securities offering.
55. Notably, an assessment of the thoroughness of due diligence is an element of

regulatory approval of an application. Question #3 of the Board’s FR Y-3 reporting form
(used for applications under Section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act), states: “If the
proposed transaction involves the acquisition of an unaffiliated banking operation or
otherwise represents a change in ownership of established banking operations, describe
briefly the due diligence review conducted on the target operations by Applicant. Indicate the
scope of and resources committed to the review, explain any significant adverse findings, and
describe the corrective action(s) to be taken to address those weaknesses.”
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Board has made this policy explicit, and the OCC and FDIC have
typically followed the same approach. 56
While other factors, such as open investigations of consumer
compliance concerns, may constrain expansionary activity, even for
satisfactorily-rated institutions, the effect is the same, in that confidential
supervisory discussions may be revealed by their known market impact
on the supervised institution. Once filed and publicly noticed,
withdrawals of applications or licensing matters are also publicly known,
and provide market signals on an institution’s supervisory status. In other
words, the agencies use the blunt lever of enforcement actions, forced
withdrawals or slowed processes for expansionary proposals, and other
tools to drive banks to act upon supervisory concerns. As a result, in
some instances the agencies themselves are revealing significant
information about an institution’s supervisory status, while
simultaneously constraining the bank’s ability to address with clarity, in
a public manner, its efforts to address those concerns, as that information
may be considered CSI.
V. OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
Among the goals for regulatory reform should be the
reconciliation of the disparate treatment of CSI by and among the
agencies, to modernize rules, and to provide greater clarity to banks and
others on the definitions and permissible usage of CSI.57 Interagency
56. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Supervision and Regulation Letter on
Enhancing Transparency in the Federal Reserve’s Applications Process (Feb. 24, 2014),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1402.htm
(“To
enhance
transparency in the Federal Reserve’s applications process and provide the banking industry
and general public with better insight into the issues that could prevent the Federal Reserve
from acting favorably on a proposal, the Federal Reserve will start publishing a semi-annual
report that provides pertinent information on applications and notices filed with the Federal
Reserve.”). There are exceptions to the Board’ general stance. For example, the Board allows
expansionary proposals for banks with less than satisfactory safety and soundness ratings only
upon: (1) convincingly demonstrating that the proposal would not distract management from
addressing the existing problems of the organization or further exacerbate these problems, (2)
demonstrating that the proposed acquisition would strengthen the organization, and (3)
responding appropriately to and making notable progress in addressing supervisory concerns.
57. Others have pointed out procedural matters adjunct to the supervisory process that
are similarly disparate and ripe for reform or harmonization, such as the appeal processes
among the agencies for review of material supervisory determinations. See Julie Andersen
Hill, When Bank Examiners Get It Wrong: Financial Institution Appeals of Material
Supervisory Determinations, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1101 (2015) (analyzing the appeals
processes for material supervisory determinations made by regulators).
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collaboration to rectify this lack of clarity should be in the interest of the
agencies themselves. Doing so would provide better clarity and
transparency to all interested parties and remove unnecessary concerns
that can impede the free-flow of information between regulators and
regulated institutions necessary to both effective supervision and to the
operations of the supervised bank. Unless required by Congress or as
necessary given the unique powers or authority of the agency, rules
governing the treatment of CSI should be as consistent as possible. To
further the goal of confidentiality and candor to enable agencies to
effectively supervise banks, the treatment of CSI should not be more or
less stringent depending upon the choice of primary federal regulator. In
addition, the treatment of CSI by the CFPB should be consistent with the
treatment of such information by the prudential regulators, again except
to the extent that the unique role and powers of the CFPB or the prudential
agency dictate otherwise. Moreover, standards of interpretation of
treatment of CSI should not be left to “agency policy” that is not set forth
in law and regulation, or at a minimum set forth in interagency regulatory
guidance.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a
study in 2016 (“GAO Report” or “Report”) that found that
“fragmentation and overlap have created inefficiencies in regulatory
processes, inconsistencies in how regulators oversee similar types of
institutions, and differences in the levels of protection afforded to
consumers.”58 The Report encourages efforts by Congress to rectify
these concerns. However, as the GAO Report points out, given the
complex, overlapping, and fragmented nature of the U.S. regulatory
system, reconciliation of competing interests among the agencies may
require a mandate from Congress as an impetus to force the agencies to
take action. The GAO Report also describes how legal constraints affect
interagency sharing of confidential information to achieve the systemic
risk monitoring and analysis goals set by the Dodd-Frank Act, which
created the Office of Financial Regulation and the Financial Stability
Oversight Council to achieve those goals. In other words, inconsistent
standards for definitions and treatment of CSI not only impact supervised

58. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-175, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS : COMPLEX AND FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE COULD BE STREAMLINED TO IMPROVE
EFFECTIVENESS (2016) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

2018] COHERENT AND CONSISTENT TREATMENT OF CSI

65

institutions, but also disrupt the government’s ability to achieve its
systemic oversight goals in a collaborative manner. 59
Some have recommended an open dialogue among regulators, the
regulated, and industry professionals, such as lawyers, consultants, and
accountants, to facilitate a more consistent understanding of the definition
and use of CSI.60 These commentators also recommend reforms
including: (1) having the prudential bank regulators adopt the CFPB’s
standard for sharing CSI with lawyers and other advisors as a practical
step; (2) providing a common and streamlined approach to obtaining
approvals for routine disclosures; and (3) taking into account the role of
attorney-client privilege as an overlapping protection and justification for
permitted disclosures. 61
Moreover, in 1979, Congress established the Federal Financial
Institutions Examinations Council (“FFIEC”) “to prescribe uniform
principles and standards for the Federal examination of financial
institutions . . . and make recommendations to promote uniformity in the
supervision of these financial institutions.”62 From the FFIEC came the
CAMELS rating system, schools for examiner training across agencies,
and other interagency efforts. It seems that the FFIEC could also be an
appropriate entity to reconcile disparate and in some cases outmoded
approaches to the definition and treatment of CSI, which is so important
to effective bank supervision.
In summary, the banking agencies have elevated the importance
of the treatment of CSI by emphasizing concerns in enforcement actions
and by issuing guidance and rules, but have not provided consistent and
coherent definitions and guidance across the industry. Reform of these
59. See GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 68–75 (“[I]f the nature of open participation of
FSOC member agency staff at the Systemic Risk Committee presents serious impediments to
meaningful sharing and discussion of confidential supervisory and other information, other
arrangements may help overcome such impediments. OFR staff said that although legal
constraints preclude them from sharing some monitors’ underlying data widely at the
Systemic Risk Committee, they could share this information with a small group, as they have
done in other settings.”). At a minimum, such an approach leads to effectively unappealable
agency action. See Greg Baer, Rethinking Safety and Soundness Supervision, THE CLEARING
HOUSE BANKING PERSPECTIVES, Q3 2017, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/research/
banking-perspectives/2017/2017-q3-banking-perspectives/safety-and-soundness-supervision
(recommending modernization of the supervision system).
60. Edward P. O’Keefe, et al., Navigating the Complexities of CSI, THE CLEARING HOUSE
BANKING PERSPECTIVES, Q1 2017, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/research/bankingperspectives/2017/2017-q1-banking-perspectives/csi-complexities.
61. Id.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 3301 (2016).
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rules would remove unnecessary uncertainty and friction, and help foster
the transparent and candid dialogue critical to effective bank supervision.

